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Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme 
Court, Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic 
Moment” 
B. Jessie Hill* 
This Article approaches the law–politics divide from a new angle.  Drawing 
on the insights of literary theory, this Article argues that every act of 
interpretation, including constitutional interpretation, inevitably draws not only 
on text but also on context, and that the relevant context extends beyond both the 
written document and the historical context of its origination.  This 
understanding derives from speech-act theory and from postmodern literary 
theory.  As Paul de Man argues in his seminal essay, The Resistance to Theory, 
moreover, the act of interpretation always encompasses a “pragmatic moment” 
that undermines the effort to attain perfect theoretical coherence.  Applying this 
perspective to constitutional interpretation, this Article argues that neither 
constitutional theory nor politics, on its own, is capable of fully explaining 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional change. 
In illustrating this phenomenon, this Article draws on recent scholarship 
about the recent evolution of constitutional doctrine in two areas—the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the religion clauses of the First Amendment—to 
demonstrate the dialectical interplay among text, principle, and pragmatism in 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional change.  Although the insights 
regarding the sources of constitutional change in these areas are not new, the 
original contribution of this Article lies in its reconfiguration of the theoretical 
understanding of how, and why, this change inevitably occurs. 
 
“The legal machine, it turns out, never works exactly as it was programmed 
to do.  It always produces a little more or a little less than the original, 
theoretical input.”1 
  
To say that constitutional law, of late, suffers from a bit of a legitimacy 
problem is like saying the Incredible Hulk has some anger management 
issues.  In the wake of the decision in National Federation of Independent 
 
 * Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research, and Laura B. 
Chisolm Distinguished Research Scholar, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  I 
would like to thank the members of the Texas Law Review, and the participants in the symposium 
on Constitutional Foundations, and in particular Professor Alex Tsesis, who provided invaluable 
feedback on an earlier draft. 
1. PAUL DE MAN, Promises (Social Contract), in ALLEGORIES OF READING: FIGURAL 
LANGUAGE IN ROUSSEAU, NIETZSCHE, RILKE, AND PROUST 246, 271 (1979). 
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Business v. Sebelius2 last summer, the Supreme Court’s approval rating fell 
well below 50%, and about three-quarters of Americans polled expressed the 
view that the Justices decide cases in part based on their personal or political 
views.3  Though perhaps more popular than Congress and cockroaches,4 the 
Supreme Court’s standing with the public appears to have shrunk of late. 
Moreover, worries about the Supreme Court’s legitimacy occasionally 
pervade not just popular journalism and legal scholarship, but also the 
opinions of the Court itself.  Facing major decisions with obvious political 
ramifications, the Justices have sometimes expressed concern about the 
impact of their decisions on the Court’s appearance of impartiality and its 
claim to apolitical referee status.  For example, in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,5 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, apparently hoping to set to 
rest once and for all both the legal and public debate over the 
constitutionality of abortion, essentially argued in their joint opinion that they 
couldn’t overrule Roe v. Wade6 because, among other reasons, it would look 
like they were bowing to political pressure.7  Chief Justice Roberts’s 
surprising vote to uphold the individual insurance mandate under the 
Affordable Care Act in NFIB may be understood as another version of the 
same idea: one might suspect that he voted to uphold the individual mandate 
because he recognized that a five-to-four vote along party lines would, 
 
2. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
3. Adam Liptak, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approve-of-supreme 
-court-in-new-poll.html?pagewanted=all. 
4. See Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Congress Less Popular than Cockroaches, Traffic 
Jams (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_Natl_010813_. 
pdf (indicating that voters have a “higher opinion” of cockroaches than Congress). 
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
7. The plurality opinion stated: 
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its 
decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as 
compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the 
principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.  Thus, the Court’s legitimacy 
depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their 
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in 
such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and 
those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the 
normal case does not carry.  It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to 
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution. 
  . . . [O]nly the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent 
could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a 
surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which 
the Court staked its authority in the first instance.  So to overrule under fire in the 
absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would 
subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 865–67 (plurality opinion). 
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despite all his insistence that he is a mere umpire calling the balls as he sees 
’em,8 make the Court look like a purely political animal rather than a 
legitimate one governed by the rule of law.9  The decision was, in other 
words, no less political simply because it was clever. 
Yet, legitimacy is a strange creature.  To use a familiar legal trope, it 
faces, Janus like,10 in two directions: inward, insofar as “legal” legitimacy 
requires that judicial decisions adhere to the professional norm of impartial, 
consistent, and principled decisionmaking; and outward, insofar as “social” 
legitimacy requires courts, who, after all, exercise real-world coercive power 
affecting the lives of individual citizens, to reach results that are broadly 
acceptable to the public at large.11  The two types of legitimacy may thus be 
in tension with one another, such as when principled doctrinal reasoning 
leads to a result that would provoke substantial public outrage or resistance.12  
At the same time, as the above examples from Casey and NFIB suggest, there 
is not always a straight line to be drawn between public opinion and social 
legitimacy.  Sometimes, greater legitimacy is engendered by bucking public 
opinion.  And, to put a somewhat more cynical spin on the issue, 
“[s]ometimes . . . what is involved in voting against one’s seeming druthers 
may be a calculation that the appearance of being ‘principled’ is rhetorically 
and politically effective.  It fools people.”13  Indeed, the now-standard script 
of Supreme Court nomination hearings, in which the nominee compares 
himself or herself to an umpire or some similar avatar of blind justice, is 
probably primarily a performance intended to shore up the public’s 
 
8. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
9. See Tonja Jacobi, Strategy and Tactics in NFIB v. Sebelius 6, 15–22 (Nw. L. & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 12-14, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2133045 (arguing that Roberts’s “driving concern [in NFIB] was for the institutional legitimacy 
of the Court”). 
10. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 956 (1994) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Janus is the god of beginnings and endings who, according to Roman 
mythology, had two faces that pointed in opposite directions.  Samuel A. Rumore, Jr., Some 
Thoughts for the Beginning of 2001, 62 ALA. LAW. 8, 8 (2001). 
11. For insightful discussions of the distinction between legal and social legitimacy, see 
generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005) 
and Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, 
Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473 (2007).  Also 
on point is Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007). 
12. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 1474 (arguing this tension is both significant and 
unavoidable as well as exaggerated); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 157–58 (positing that the Supreme 
Court avoids provoking public outrage that could ensue from a decision on a controversial topic by 
refusing to rule on it). 
13. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 31, 51–52 (2005).  Contra the NFIB example, though, Judge Posner argues that such 
voting against self-interest occurs primarily when the stakes of the decision are low.  Id. at 50–51. 
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confidence (and that of the public’s democratically elected representatives), 
rather than a sincere and deeply felt statement of judicial philosophy. 
Constitutional scholars have attacked the legitimacy problem, along 
with the related problem of maintaining the strict divide between law and 
politics, from various angles.  Originalists have long argued that hewing 
closely to constitutional text is the only approach that ensures fidelity to the 
document itself and the act of interpretation (as opposed to lawmaking) with 
which the Justices have been charged.14  They view such fidelity as 
automatically both legitimate and legitimating, since it is the only approach 
that remains true to the text that the Framers adopted.15  Proponents of 
“living,” or progressive, constitutionalism argue, by contrast, that the Court 
cannot be accepted as legitimate if its opinions do not take account of 
changing societal circumstances and values.16  Popular constitutionalists, for 
their part, argue that we the people should take the Constitution away from 
the courts altogether, or that “the people themselves,” in contrast to unelected 
and unaccountable judges, should play a central role in interpreting the 
Constitution.17  And some “backlash” theorists claim that far from 
 
14. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–63 
(1989) (arguing that originalism is “more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution 
in a democratic system” in that it assigns judges the task of determining original meaning and 
democratically elected officials the task of taking account of changing societal values); see also 
Andrew B. Coan, Talking Originalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 847, 849, 852, 858–59 (2009) (citing 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143 (1990); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110–59 (1999); 
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 234 (1988)) (“[T]he original meaning of the 
Constitution is the only meaning the People have democratically endorsed.”). 
15. See Coan, supra note 14. 
16. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 5–6 (2005) (arguing that “courts should take greater account of the Constitution’s 
democratic nature when they interpret constitutional and statutory texts”). 
17. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7–8 (2004) (“[I]t was ‘the people themselves’––working through and 
responding to their agents in the government––who were responsible for seeing that [the 
Constitution] was properly interpreted and implemented.  The idea of turning this responsibility 
over to judges was simply unthinkable.”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS 181–82 (1999) (“[Populist constitutional law] treats constitutional law not as 
something in the hands of lawyers and judges but in the hands of the people themselves.”); see also 
Larry D. Kramer, Lectures, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, 
and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006) (“[Popular 
constitutionalism] does not assume that authoritative legal interpretation can take place only in 
courts, but rather supposes that an equally valid process of interpretation can be undertaken in the 
political branches and by the community at large.”).  Professor Barry Friedman gives a brief, helpful 
listing of sources both promoting and criticizing popular constitutionalism in BARRY FRIEDMAN, 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 564 n.266 (2009). 
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performing a settling function, the Supreme Court’s intervention in high-
stakes political issues only stokes the flames it was intended to squelch.18 
When push comes to shove, though, virtually all agree that the Supreme 
Court should have some role in interpreting the Constitution.  A principal 
point of disagreement centers on how this interpretation should proceed—
specifically, on the extent to which the function of law can and should be 
meaningfully distinct from politics.  This issue relates to the problem of 
determining the extent to which social and cultural facts should influence 
legal decisionmaking.  Moreover, lurking within this debate is concern about 
change in constitutional meaning over time.  If legal interpretation is truly 
principled, it would appear that it must be insulated against the political 
pressures of the time, and therefore much change in constitutional meaning—
especially change that appears to take into account new political and social 
circumstances—would prove difficult to explain.19 
Drawing on the insights of literary theory, this Article argues that every 
act of interpretation, including constitutional interpretation, inevitably draws 
not only on text but on context, and that the relevant context extends beyond 
both the written document and the historical context of its origination to 
contemporary social and cultural facts on the ground.  This understanding 
derives from speech-act theory and from postmodern literary theory.20  As 
Paul de Man argues in his seminal essay, The Resistance to Theory, the act of 
interpretation always encompasses a “pragmatic moment” that undermines 
the effort to attain perfect theoretical coherence.21  Applying this perspective 
to constitutional interpretation, this Article argues that neither constitutional 
theory nor politics, on its own, is capable of fully explaining constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional change. 
 
18. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 388–401 (2007) (discussing backlash theories); David 
Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a National 
Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 741 (2012) (describing the argument that the Court’s 
decisions regarding controversial issues creates a backlash against perceived “outside interference” 
or “judicial activism” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
19. But not impossible.  One could believe that a particular constitutional provision was 
intended or designed to take changing circumstances into account, and thus allowing constitutional 
meaning to change would still mean hewing closely to original intent or another principled 
approach, such as subscribing to the view that the Constitution serves certain enduring values but 
that the content of those values may evolve over time.  See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 14 (2011) (arguing that the Framers, by choosing to use general and abstract concepts 
in the Constitution, meant for future generations to interpret and implement them).  Alternately, one 
could support a change in meaning on the basis that the original interpretation of a constitutional 
provision was simply incorrect. 
20. The term “postmodern literary theory” refers to a body of literary, artistic, and philosophical 
thought that arose in the second half of the twentieth century as a reaction to modernism and is most 
closely associated with deconstruction, a philosophy primarily developed by the French theorist 
Jacques Derrida.  Kay Torney Souter, The Products of the Imagination: Psychoanalytic Theory and 
Postmodern Literary Criticism, 60 AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 341, 345 (2000). 
21. Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory, 63 YALE FRENCH STUD. 3 (1982), reprinted in 33 
THEORY AND HISTORY OF LITERATURE: THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY 8 (1986). 
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In illustrating this phenomenon, this Article draws on examples in two 
areas—the Fourteenth Amendment and the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment—to demonstrate the dialectical interplay among text, principle, 
and pragmatism in constitutional interpretation and constitutional change.  Of 
course, others have already argued that law and politics need not always exist 
in absolute contrast with one another but may instead stand in a dialectical 
relationship.22  The principal contribution of this Article, however, is to 
propose a new theoretical underpinning for making sense of the relationship 
between law and culture, as well as the inherent instability of the law–politics 
divide. 
Part I of this Article describes the law–politics divide and reviews some 
of the important recent scholarship on that subject.  The purported distinction 
between judging, or interpreting the law, and engaging in political 
decisionmaking lies at the heart of much of the anxiety over judicial 
legitimacy, as well as of debates over the merits of originalism as compared 
to living constitutionalism.23  As this Article will demonstrate, the distinction 
between the two, while not meaningless, is nonetheless inherently unstable.  
Part II begins to make this case by reviewing Paul de Man’s classic essay 
The Resistance to Theory, which elucidates the process of literary 
interpretation and applies it in general terms to constitutional interpretation.  
Part III then puts this theory to work through examples drawn from notable 
constitutional controversies.  Finally, Part IV asks why and how this 
particular perspective makes any difference to our understanding of 
constitutional interpretation. 
I. Law and Politics 
In a Harvard Law Review Foreword from a few years ago, Judge 
Richard Posner argued that, as a constitutional court, the Supreme Court is 
inherently and inevitably a political court.24  In so stating, Judge Posner 
implicitly and explicitly contrasted politics with “law.”25  Though it is 
supposed to be “tethered to authoritative texts,” the argument proceeds,26 the 
Supreme Court is instead profoundly political because of certain structural 
features—particularly, its responsibility to decide emotional, politically 
polarizing constitutional issues; the open-ended and broad nature of the 
constitutional text, which fails to impose any meaningful internal constraints 
on the Justices; and the lack of external constraints on the Justices’ 
 
22. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 18, at 376. 
23. I use the term “living constitutionalism” here to refer to all nonoriginalist theories of 
constitutional interpretation, with the recognition that both originalism and nonoriginalism are 
heterogeneous schools of thought.  The point is to distinguish among constitutional theories on this 
one dimension, rather than to lump all originalist or nonoriginalist constitutional theories together. 
24. Posner, supra note 13, at 39–54. 
25. Id. at 45–46. 
26. Id. at 40. 
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decisionmaking.27  For Posner, the political nature of constitutional law is 
both lamentable and inevitable.28 
Others have argued that the encroachment of politics on constitutional 
law is not completely unavoidable, but that the temptation of results-oriented 
judging is great, and undermines the legitimacy of the law, all the same.  
Thus, according to this perspective, “constitutional law defines its integrity 
precisely in terms of its independence from political influence.  From the 
internal perspective of the law, the law–politics distinction is constitutive of 
legality.”29  The most famous proponent of this view is probably Herbert 
Wechsler,30 but it continues to resonate in contemporary discourse.31 
From yet another perspective, originalism may be understood, at least in 
part, as a response to the problem of law’s legitimacy and the need to keep it 
distinct from politics.  Though the proposition is far from being beyond 
debate, originalists generally contend that their mode of interpretation is 
more principled because it is tied to the one meaning that was democratically 
adopted by the people of the United States, and that, unlike nonoriginalists, 
they are not free to impose their own values on the texts they decode.32  
Thus, for example, Justice Scalia’s famous defense of originalism contends 
that, because the purpose of the Constitution is “precisely to prevent the law 
from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting 
the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable,” originalism is the best 
mode of achieving the Constitution’s goals.33  Indeed, Justice Scalia argues 
that originalism avoids “aggravat[ing] the principal weakness of the system, 
for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from 
the preferences of the judge himself.”34 
In contrast to these various worrying approaches to the law–politics 
divide, some scholars have embraced the influence of popular attitudes on 
law as not only structurally inevitable, but also as a positive influence that 
should be embraced, at least to some degree, rather than suppressed.  
Proponents of “democratic constitutionalism,” for example, argue that 
“constitutional meaning bends to the insistence of popular beliefs and yet 
 
27. Id. at 39–43. 
28. See id. at 76. 
29. Post & Siegel, supra note 18, at 384. 
30. See, e.g., Hebert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 11–12 (1959) (identifying “the deepest problem of our constitutionalism” as finding 
“criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of 
willfulness or will”). 
31. Regarding the resonance of the view of law as distinct from politics because of its 
principled nature, see supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
32. See, e.g., Coan, supra note 14, at 852, 857 (acknowledging the defenses of originalism 
based on democracy and judicial restraint).  The criticisms of this assertion are well-known and 
need not be repeated here.  For an overview, see generally id. 
33. Scalia, supra note 14, at 862. 
34. Id. at 864. 
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simultaneously retains integrity as law.”35  Professors Robert Post and Reva 
Siegel argue that the Court cannot avoid public controversy surrounding the 
sorts of cases it hears, nor can it avoid being influenced by popular 
understandings of the Constitution; judges, therefore, must acknowledge the 
conflicting sides in a constitutional debate and “assess the . . . relevant 
constitutional values,” employing “exquisite sensitivity to context.”36  
Similarly, Professors Robert Post and Neil Siegel assert that principled legal 
reasoning should not be understood to be incompatible with the expression of 
“fundamental social values,” which they argue is, itself, one purpose of the 
law.37  Thus, professional legal reasoning is and should be “in dialogue with 
public values.”38  Finally, in a recent book, Professor Barry Friedman argues 
that the popular will has always influenced judicial understandings, and vice 
versa.39  And so far, at least, the sky has not fallen. 
This Article is mostly in line with this last line of thought regarding the 
law–politics divide.  It argues that the distinction is neither as important nor 
as firm as legal-process scholars and originalists seem to suggest.  It suggests 
a different reason for this view, however—one that is based in the nature of 
language itself, rather than in the structure of our political system or the 
nature of judging.  By the same token, this analysis also suggests that 
theoretical coherence in the act of interpretation is inevitably undermined by 
the reality that interpretation must reach beyond the text itself to the messy 
social and political context in which it exists. 
Before moving on to that linguistic explanation, however, it is important 
to clarify just what is meant by “politics.”  The term “politics” can have 
multiple meanings, and the above-described schools of thought regarding the 
law–politics divide seem to deploy various ones.  In some views, “politics” is 
synonymous with ideology or, what may amount to the same thing, personal 
predilection.  This seems to be the sense in which Judge Posner uses the 
term.40  Many originalists also seem most concerned about the influence of 
politics in that sense of the term.  Another meaning of “politics,” however, 
would be public opinion or (to use a more elevated term) public values—
with the term “public” perhaps serving as a stand-in for “majority” or 
“widely shared.”  This is the sense in which democratic constitutionalists and 
their ilk appear to understand the term.  Finally, one might use the term 
“politics” to refer simply to political and cultural reality, or pragmatic 
 
35. Post & Siegel, supra note 18, at 376. 
36. See id. at 425–27 (suggesting that judges need not avoid controversy in order to maintain 
their proper judicial role). 
37. Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 1510. 
38. Id. at 1510–11. 
39. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17. 
40. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 13, at 51 (referring to “conventional ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
ideologies”); Richard A. Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral 
and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1654 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics] 
(describing political platforms, such as Marxism and Communism, as ideologies). 
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considerations of the context and impact of judicial decisions.  Though this is 
a less common usage of the term, it also appears to play a role in the 
democratic constitutionalists’ understandings of politics and is often opposed 
to law in scholarly discourse.  It is in this last sense—the most general 
sense—that I use the term here in arguing that politics inevitably plays a role 
in interpretation. 
II. Resistance to Constitutional Theory 
In his seminal essay The Resistance to Theory, Paul de Man lays out a 
metatheoretical argument—a theory about literary theory.41  In part, the essay 
is an attempt to understand what, if anything, makes literary theory distinct 
from other disciplines and practices, such as philosophy, that exert a 
gravitational pull upon it.42  This central dilemma, of course, calls to mind 
the debate over the uniqueness of legal and constitutional theory, which 
partakes of other disciplines but seeks to remain independent of them.43  
Ultimately, de Man proposes that “[l]iterary theory may now well have 
become a legitimate concern of philosophy but it cannot be assimilated to it,” 
because literary theory “contains a necessarily pragmatic moment that 
certainly weakens it as theory but that adds a subversive element of 
unpredictability and makes it something of a wild card in the serious game of 
the theoretical disciplines.”44  The subversive unpredictability of literary 
theory is what de Man calls “resistance,” and that resistance comes not only 
from outside but also from within the theory itself.45  As explained below, 
de Man’s conclusions apply to, and have significant consequences for, 
constitutional theory as well. 
According to de Man, the rise of literary theory46 corresponds to the rise 
of a certain linguistic self-consciousness in the twentieth century—the 
newfound focus on language and the meaning and function of signification, 
which was accompanied by the recognition that there is a difference—a kind 
of play in the joints—between words and the objects or concepts to which 
they refer.47  This recognition was accompanied by a growing acceptance of 
the view that language and meaning are functions of convention rather than 
of some sort of natural or inevitable mechanism.48  The conventional view of 
language, of course, is one of the fundamental postulates of postmodernism; 
it leads to the conclusion that the relationship between words and the real-
 
41. de Man, supra note 21, at 3. 
42. Id. at 4–5.  So-called continental philosophy has been particularly influential within 
postmodern literary theory.  Id. at 7–8. 
43. See, e.g., Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1693–98 (criticizing the view that moral 
theory should inform legal decisionmaking). 
44. de Man, supra note 21, at 8. 
45. Id. at 19. 
46. Literary theory is here contrasted with “literary history” and “literary criticism.”  Id. at 8. 
47. Id. at 8–10. 
48. Id. 
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world objects they refer to is both arbitrary and unstable.49  Yet, according to 
de Man, it is a view that is not always embraced, and it is one that 
ideologues, in particular, reject: as de Man puts it, 
[N]o one in his right mind will try to grow grapes by the luminosity of 
the word “day,” but it is very difficult not to conceive the pattern of 
one’s past and future existence as in accordance with temporal and 
spatial schemes that belong to fictional narratives and not to the 
world.50 
In other words, we easily understand in some cases, as with everyday words 
like “day,” that the word and the object to which it refers are distinct; it is 
much harder, however, to recognize that our most deeply held beliefs and 
perceptions of the world do not necessarily reflect a fixed and natural reality.  
Thus, he continues, “[I]deology is precisely the confusion of linguistic with 
natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism.”51 
De Man contends, however, that it is the function of literary theory to 
unmask this very tendency to confuse.  Literary theory thus defeats ideology, 
and ideological attempts to discredit literary theory consequently evidence 
the critics’ “fear at having their own ideological mystifications exposed by 
the tool they are trying to discredit.”52  Yet, at the same time, literary theory 
itself encounters resistance—a resistance from within, which de Man 
suggests is an inevitable, constituent element of the theoretical project 
itself.53  De Man explains that this “resistance” is a “resistance to the use of 
language about language,” as well as to “language itself or to the possibility 
that language contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced to 
intuition.”54 
Central to de Man’s argument are a dichotomy and a trichotomy, or 
trivium.  The dichotomy is between theory and aesthetics.  Theory, of course, 
means the same thing in the context of literary theory as in constitutional 
theory: an attempt to construct a closed system with the power to explain 
substantially all facts or events within a given universe, but which is itself 
speculative rather than factual.55  Aesthetics, by contrast, involves attention 
to pleasurable, beautiful, or other sensory aspects of language—an embrace 
of the phenomenological effects of language in the real world.56  An aesthetic 
approach to poetry, for example, might be one that emphasizes the sounds of 
 
49. Id. at 10. 
50. Id. at 11. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 12. 
54. Id. at 12–13. 
55. See Wlad Godzich, Foreword to 33 THEORY AND HISTORY OF LITERATURE: THE 
RESISTANCE TO THEORY ix, xiii (1986) (defining theory as “a system of concepts that aims to give a 
global explanation to an area of knowledge” which is “oppose[d] . . . to praxis by virtue of the fact 
that it is a form of speculative knowledge”). 
56. See de Man, supra note 21, at 7–8. 
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the words and the harmonious effects of particular rhyme and rhythm 
schemes.  An aesthetic reading of the Constitution might involve an 
appreciation of the elegance of its language—a not wholly ridiculous, but 
also not apparently useful, undertaking for lawyers to engage in. 
At the same time, the concept of aesthetics as deployed by de Man can 
be understood more broadly, to refer to any focus on the real-world effects of 
language.  This aesthetic approach is opposed to a theoretical reading that 
understands a text as an instantiation of a particular world view, ideology, or 
interpretive theory.57  Such theoretical readings inevitably attempt to 
assimilate the text to the overarching explanatory system that claims to 
comprehend it.  The aesthetic approach, by contrast, pretends to no such 
grand ambition. 
Related to the theory–aesthetics dichotomy is the classical trivium of 
logic, grammar, and rhetoric, which represented the sum total of language 
and linguistics in classical thought.58  Classical linguistics established a 
hierarchy, in which logic, which is related both to philosophy and 
mathematics, stood at the top.59  As de Man explains, this prioritization of 
logic, as well as its affiliation with mathematics, entails a “continuity 
between a theory of language, as logic, and the knowledge of the 
phenomenal world”—a belief that language, as the vehicle of logic, closely 
reflects the reality of the world around us.60 
Grammar, in the middle, was the study of language with the aim of 
understanding how language essentially operationalizes the principles of 
logic.61  And rhetoric, the lowest in the hierarchy, was comprised simply of 
the study of persuasive or figurative language—of literary tropes, which were 
extensively catalogued in grammatical terms, and their deployment in the 
service of persuasion.62  This hierarchy helps to construct a particular 
relationship between theory and aesthetics, or reality on the ground.63  There 
is a correspondence between them, in which theory (logic) is understood to 
reflect, by virtue of human reason, reality (aesthetics).64  But theory, as the 
product of reason, clearly stands above base reality, which lies constantly in 
need of analysis and interpretation. 
 
57. Id. at 10–11. 
58. Christopher Norris, Law, Deconstruction, and the Resistance to Theory, 15 J.L. & SOC’Y 
166, 177 (1988). 
59. See id. 
60. de Man, supra note 21, at 13. 
61. Norris, supra note 58. 
62. Id. 
63. See de Man, supra note 21, at 13 (equating, implicitly, the relationship between language, 
as logic, and knowledge of the phenomenal world, which is accessible through mathematics, with 
the relationship between theory and aesthetics). 
64. See id. at 14 (“The continuity between theory and phenomenalism is asserted and preserved 
by the system itself.”). 
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De Man readopts this classical trio, not as a hierarchy but rather as an 
exemplar of the inevitable tensions within interpretation.65  In postmodern 
literary theory, which rejects the preeminence of logic and the corresponding 
notion of a natural or inevitable symmetry between language and reality, the 
hierarchy is at the very least inverted—the rhetorical aspect of language takes 
precedence over its logical aspect.66  De Man claims that “reading”—which 
for him means a close reading that is particularly attentive to the multiple 
possible meanings of a text—partakes of both grammar and rhetoric and is a 
privileged site of tension between them.67  In particular, de Man argues that 
“the grammatical decoding of a text leaves a residue of indetermination that 
. . . cannot be[] resolved by grammatical means.”68  The resistance to 
(literary) theory is thus, in essence, a resistance to reading.  The resistance to 
theory—really, a resistance within theory—is thus a resistance to that which 
ultimately undermines any attempt to systematize the meaning of the text—it 
is an attentiveness to the uncertainties, the indeterminacies, and the 
inconvenient moments within the text itself, which assimilate poorly to grand 
overarching theories, or resist that assimilation altogether.  For de Man, these 
moments are created by “figural” language, which by its very essence opens 
up multiple and often self-contradictory meanings, all of which may be 
technically, or “grammatically,” correct.69  Yet, the “literary” text is not the 
only kind of text that presents this dilemma—de Man claims that, while more 
explicit in literature, the figurative dimension of language—the aspect of 
language that escapes easy grammatical clarification yielding only one 
possible correct meaning—“can be revealed in any verbal event when it is 
read textually.”70 
De Man ties his theory of reading to speech-act theory.  Like 
postmodern literary theory, speech-act theory has recognized the essentially 
conventional nature of language and, thus, of meaning.71  For de Man, 
 
65. Id. at 13. 
66. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL INTERROGATIONS 
140 (1991) (describing how postmodern theory emphasizes rhetoric over “any systematic or 
comprehensive theoretical position”). 
67. de Man, supra note 21, at 15. 
68. Id. 
69. See id. at 16 (discussing this problem in the context of interpreting the meaning of the title 
of Keats’s The Fall of Hyperion and noting that “[f]aced with the ineluctable necessity to come to a 
decision, no grammatical or logical analysis can help us out”). 
70. Id. at 17.  Thus, “once a reader has become aware of the rhetorical dimensions of a text, he 
will not be amiss in finding textual instances that are irreducible to grammar or to historically 
determined meaning.”  Id. at 18. 
71. Id. at 18–19.  As I have explained elsewhere, what I call “meaning” here roughly correlates 
with “illocutionary force” in the parlance of speech-act theory.  See B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious 
Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 511–
14 (2005).  “Illocutionary force” is often defined as the effect of language—what language does or 
what act it performs (asserting, urging, certifying, begging)—rather than what the individual words 
denote.  See John Searle, What is a Speech Act?, in THE COMMUNICATION THEORY READER 263 
(Paul Cobley ed., 1996). 
2013] Resistance to Constitutional Theory 1827 
 
 
speech-act theory is correct to recognize the conventional nature of meaning 
but is wrong to suggest that it is reducible to convention, especially insofar as 
it aspires to fix and determine, once and for all, the functioning of language 
by specifying all of the conventional elements that produce a particular kind 
of meaning (or “illocutionary force”).72  But speech-act theory can also be 
read in light of postmodernism’s understanding of language as inevitably 
context-bound and of context as boundless.73  A speech-act theory that does 
not fall prey to the attempt to create a totalizing language system that tames 
and controls all possible meaning is one that recognizes the dependency of 
language on context—not just the immediate textual context but also the 
historical and social context in which it is read.74 
For de Man, postmodern literary theory, in so far as it engages in 
reading, always reads texts in essentially the same way—as both asserting 
and performing their own indeterminacy.75  Reading thus dramatizes the 
failure of language to reach the certainty and the reflectiveness of reality to 
which it appears to aspire—or, put differently, the ability of language to 
escape any and every attempt to pin it to a single meaning or reference.76  As 
such, these postmodern readings are in fact “theory and not theory at the 
same time, the universal theory of the impossibility of theory.”77 
Whatever interest de Man’s argument holds—hopefully as more than a 
historical artifact—its application to constitutional theory may not be 
immediately apparent.  In this Article, I certainly hope to steer clear of the 
classical critical legal theory brand of meaning-debunking, itself definitively 
debunked by Stanley Fish and others.78  Rather, I wish to contend that de 
 
72. de Man, supra note 21, at 19.  De Man refers to classical theorists of speech acts, such as 
John Searle and J.L. Austin. 
73. See, e.g., Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for 
Artistic Expression, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1541–42 (1996) (“Meaning is context-bound, but 
context is boundless.” (quoting JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND 
CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 123 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Hill, supra 
note 71, at 514–16 (“Context, however, is itself an extremely unstable device for discerning 
meaning.  Although meaning is dependent on context, it is usually impossible to fully describe or 
delimit the relevant context . . . .”). 
74. Hill, supra note 71, at 517–22.  An originalist might acknowledge the importance of context 
but argue that meaning should be dependent only on the context in which it was written.  There are, 
however, several difficulties with this view.  One is that historical context is virtually impossible to 
recapture in full; another is that constitutional language must continue to be applied in new, 
contemporary contexts and speak to contemporary problems.  Few, if any, originalists would go so 
far as to say that constitutional language means only what it could have meant in the context of late 
eighteenth-century America.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) 
(Scalia, J.) (rejecting as “bordering on the frivolous” the notion that only those arms available at the 
founding are encompassed by the Second Amendment’s protections). 
75. de Man, supra note 21, at 15–19. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 19. 
78. Norris, supra note 58, at 173 (citing Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 
96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1796 n.60 (1987)). 
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Man’s argument has several specific implications for the project of 
constitutional theory. 
First, de Man’s point that language inevitably tends to take on a life of 
its own and thereby to resist any attempt at fitting all meaning within a neat, 
totalizing theory would seem to apply to legal language as well as literary.  
For this protean quality of language is at least in part a feature of language’s 
inevitable dependence on context and the underlying change within that 
(social, historical, political) context.  The failure of theory to make sense of 
language is particularly apparent with respect to originalist theories, which 
are obviously undermined by the understanding that language takes on new 
meanings in light of changed circumstances.  Any theory that claims to 
assimilate the text entirely to it, de Man suggests, is refusing to really “read” 
that text.79 
It is important to recognize, however, that de Man is not here making a 
general claim that meaning is always indeterminate and unknowable, nor is 
that a claim I wish to make here.  He does argue, however, that the meaning 
of texts—including legal texts—cannot be specified in any transcendent or 
permanent way.  There is no meaning, whether based on the text alone or on 
the framers’ intent, that can answer questions about how the text should 
apply in new and unanticipated circumstances.80  Thus, the ways in which 
any constitutional theory is constantly questioned and ultimately undermined 
by the changing social context in which the constitutional text must be read 
and applied is precisely the “resistance” to and within theory to which 
de Man refers. 
This resistance is, moreover, on the view of postmodern speech-act 
theorists, inherent in the dependency of all speech acts on context.81  The 
context dependency of meaning may seem intuitive, of course, but it also 
derives from the recognition that language is conventional.  Although one 
might argue that words have definitions that can be found in an objective 
way—for example by looking in a dictionary, utterances (sentences or 
speech acts) can only have meaning in a particular context.  Thus, the phrase 
“I do” means very little standing on its own, typed on a page; it carries great 
significance, both legal and cultural, if it is said in the context of a marriage 
ceremony in which all of the relevant formalities have been met; and it is 
surely decipherable but carries decidedly less weight if it is spoken in a play, 
in front of an actor who is dressed as, and to everyone’s understanding is 
merely pretending to be, a justice of the peace.82  This context dependency is 
 
79. For examples of this phenomenon, see infra Part III.  “Reading,” for de Man, means close 
reading, with special attention to the multiple meanings and potential for indeterminacy within a 
text.  de Man, supra note 21, at 24. 
80. See DE MAN, supra note 1, at 270–71; Norris, supra note 58, at 175–76. 
81. CULLER, supra note 73, at 123–24; Hill, supra note 71, at 515. 
82. But see LEMONY SNICKET, A SERIES OF UNFORTUNATE EVENTS NO. 1: THE BAD 
BEGINNING 133–44 (1999) (narrating the story of a mischievous count who tries to steal an 
orphan’s fortune by staging a play in which the orphan plays the part of the count’s bride-to-be and, 
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generalizable, of course, and it stretches beyond the example of certain 
formalities being required in order for a speech act to have legal force.83 
Yet context is both impossible to specify completely and always 
changing.84  As Jonathan Culler puts it, “Meaning is context-bound, but 
context is boundless.”85  Context is boundless in the sense that it can always 
be further specified, as any lawyer knows.  The exercise of distinguishing 
disfavorable precedent is often nothing more than the act of highlighting an 
element of the factual context in the prior case that may have escaped notice 
or seemed unimportant at the time but that is infused with significance for the 
later case.86  And no matter how carefully one tries to delimit the context—to 
specify the rules under which a certain expression means a certain thing—a 
new context can always be created that evades the rules one creates.87  
Jonathan Culler gives the example of a sign in an airport informing 
passengers that all remarks about bombs will be taken seriously: what 
meaning would we impute, he asks, if a passenger approached an airport 
worker and asked, “If I were to remark that I had a bomb in my shoe, you 
would have to take it seriously, wouldn’t you?”88  Could the problem be 
solved by specifying that remarks about remarks about bombs must be taken 
seriously?  And so on, and so on, in an infinite regress?89 
Importantly, part of the unmanageable and illimitable context is the 
cultural and political context, which has particular importance for 
constitutional interpretation.  Thus, the constantly changing context of 
politics, culture, and facts on the ground—what de Man might call the 
aesthetic—is inevitably bound up with the act of interpretation, just as it also, 
equally inevitably, escapes the totalizing attempts of theory.  This context is 
the “pragmatic moment” that is essential to constitutional interpretation but 
weakens constitutional theory.90 
 
unbeknownst to her, the woman playing the justice of the peace is an actual justice who performs an 
actual, valid marriage ceremony on stage).  I employ the “I do” example in Hill, supra note 71, at 
512. 
83. Sometimes the context even includes that which is not written.  For example, Akhil Amar 
notes that Chief Justice John Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 353–56 
(1819), drew on the use of the word “necessary” in other contexts, including outside the 
Constitution itself, to demonstrate that, if the Framers had meant to give Congress only those 
powers explicitly delegated in the Constitution, it would have said so.  See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 800 (1999).  According to Amar, “Marshall is contrasting 
the actual wording of the Constitution not merely with what it could have said . . . or with what 
another clause of the Constitution does say . . . .  Rather, he is contrasting the text of the 
Constitution with what its predecessor document said.”  Id. 
84. Hill, supra note 71, at 515–16. 
85. CULLER, supra note 73, at 123. 
86. Hill, supra note 71, at 515–16. 
87. Id. 
88. CULLER, supra note 73, at 124–25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89. See id. at 125. 
90. Professor Stanley Fish makes a similar point in arguing that the practice of judging and 
theories of legal interpretation are entirely distinct and, indeed, have nothing to do with one another.  
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At this point an originalist or textualist might raise an objection to my 
insistence that the present, ever-changing political and cultural context is the 
context in which the Constitution must be interpreted.  Originalists, after all, 
believe that the “original public meaning” of a term is the relevant one.91  
And what are originalism and its cousin textualism, if not themselves dreams 
of a return to a strict form of reading?  This might appear to suggest that the 
problem posed for interpretation by the ever-changing context of the present 
is thus solved by an original-public-meaning approach according to 
originalists. 
But this objection misses the mark in several respects.  First, the reading 
that originalists espouse is not a de Manian reading—rather, it is a sort of 
prelapsarian reading, a perfect reading that itself resembles theory in its 
attempt to achieve one true and coherent past truth.  But any text can only be 
read in the present, not in the past; the influence of context thus pervades 
interpretation whether the interpreter wishes it to or not.92  Indeed, to think 
that one’s reconstruction of a past context is the same as actually discovering 
what an utterance meant to some “original public” bears a striking 
resemblance to the exercise of trying to grow grapes by the luminosity of the 
word “day.”93  Or, as Professor Jamal Greene puts it, “At no point in our 
constitutional history did any democratically responsible institution 
determine and embody within a text the notion that state and local actors 
should be bound by Justice Scalia’s considered view of the eighteenth-
century meaning of the Bill of Rights.”94  While originalists may be partly 
correct in claiming that the goal of interpretation is to discover the original 
intent behind an utterance, they deny that there is a difference between this 
reconstruction of original intent and the actual intent itself. 
Moreover, as I have explained elsewhere, the very nature of meaning as 
convention driven implies that it must also be capable of repetition: an 
utterance can only function as meaningful if it can be repeated in different 
 
They are different practices with different goals.  See Fish, supra note 78, at 1785–87 (claiming that 
judging does not involve adherence to an “underlying set of rules and principles” but should instead 
strive for pragmatic coherence in decisionmaking). 
91. Or at least, this is what the “new originalists” think.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, 
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, 
Interpretation and Construction] (“[O]riginalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that 
identifies the meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of its enactment.”); Randy E. 
Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 627–29 (1999) (“The public 
meaning of the words of the Constitution . . . could be gleaned from a number of sources, including 
the records of the convention, but where those intentions differed from the public understanding, it 
is the public meaning that should prevail.”).  See generally Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New 
Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 610–11 (2008). 
92. Cf. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on 
“The Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of Jews,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1518–19 
(1999) (describing legal interpretation as a performance in which interpretive choices must be made 
and audiences persuaded anew each time). 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51. 
94. Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 988 (2012). 
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contexts and still be comprehensible.95  Yet each repetition also opens up the 
possibility of the utterance’s meaning being changed: 
If language is conventional, it must function according to a set of 
learnable, and thus reproducible, rules.  The functionality of language 
depends, in other words, on its ability to be repeated—on the ability of 
certain speech acts to be replicated in a variety of contexts.  This 
ability to be repeated, or “iterability,” also means that any linguistic 
utterance is capable of being cut off from both its original context and 
its speaker’s intent to be reproduced in a context that may change or 
undermine its prior meaning.  Indeed, no speech act could function at 
all if this were not the case—that is, if it were not both conventional 
and iterable.  The conventionality and iterability of speech acts ensure 
that the speech act can be recognized, understood, and reproduced by 
different speakers and listeners, but they also ensure that language can 
be used in ways that may not have been originally intended.96 
The context dependency of language, which gives rise to its iterability, is 
thus the element that creates the possibility that any purportedly fixed, 
intentional meaning can always be undermined.  In addition, it throws into 
question the originalist notion of a distinction between “interpretation” and 
“construction.”  As Professor Randy Barnett explains it, “Interpretation is 
the activity of identifying the semantic meaning of a particular use of 
language in context.  Construction is the activity of applying that meaning to 
particular factual circumstances.”97  But as Barnett himself acknowledged, 
meaning must be specified “in context”; words do not have any meaning—
and certainly not a fixed meaning—without a context.98  Even assuming one 
could agree with originalists that the era of enactment is the relevant 
historical context, moreover, it must be acknowledged that determining the 
boundaries of the relevant context is itself an interpretive choice.  One must 
make decisions about whether the context of the word “necessary” in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause includes only the words of the Clause itself, the 
entire Constitution (which includes the same word in Article II, Section 3 and 
the synonym “needful” in Article IV, Section 3), or all contemporary uses of 
the word.99  Moreover, one might reasonably question how, precisely, to 
delineate the historical time period that one can consider in determining 
“contemporary” uses and whether meaning can really be pinpointed to a 
particular moment in time.  For example, is the Slaughter-House100 Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, discussed below, sufficiently 
 
95. B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change in 
Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 738–39 (2010). 
96. Id. at 738 (footnote omitted). 
97. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 91, at 66. 
98. See id. at 67–68. 
99. Amar, supra note 83, at 755–58 (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819)). 
100. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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contemporaneous to deserve equal weight with the Amendment’s framers’ 
own views?  At each turn a choice must be made to enforce linguistic clarity 
against the inevitable tendency of meaning to multiply once a word is 
committed to paper.  Choices always must be made among possible 
meanings, as meaning does not exist without context.  All interpretation is 
also construction. 
Finally, the very structure of a constitution itself suggests that an 
attempt merely to construct past meaning is wrongheaded.  As de Man argues 
in an essay on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, a social contract 
“never refers to a situation that exists in the present, but signals toward a 
hypothetical future . . . .  All laws are future-oriented and prospective; their 
illocutionary mode is that of the promise.”101  Those promises are understood 
to have been made at some past time, but their legitimacy must be verified 
and accepted in the present, at the moment of the state’s application of 
coercive force.102  This would seem to be the understanding on which any 
social contract—and thus any constitution—must be based.  Therefore, 
“‘when the Law speaks in the name of the people, it is in the name of the 
people of today and not of the past’.  The definition of this ‘people of today’ 
is impossible, however, for the eternal present of the contract can never apply 
as such to any particular present.”103 
III. Examples 
What follows are examples of how the language of the Constitution, 
read closely, escapes any attempt to fix it, and of how provisional meaning 
can be reached only by means of considering the broader social and political 
context.  Of course, de Man’s point about language, as I have described it, is 
sufficiently general that it would have to apply to all language and a true 
demonstration, rather than an illustration, of it would have to be considerably 
more exhaustive than what I offer here.  But given the limitations of time and 
space, I offer instead two brief examples to show how one might connect 
de Man’s theory to constitutional interpretation and the failures of 
constitutional theory, particularly originalism. 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause 
Could there be a clearer example of original intent than the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s intended overruling of Dred Scott v. Sandford’s104 holding that 
African-Americans are not “citizens” of the United States?105  Even the 
conservative Slaughter-House Court recognized that this was the inevitable 
 
101. DE MAN, supra note 1, at 273; see also Norris, supra note 58, at 174–76, 180 (discussing 
the same passage in relation to legal interpretation). 
102. See DE MAN, supra note 1, at 273. 
103. Id.  (internal citation omitted). 
104. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Scott, 60 U.S. at 422–23. 
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import of that provision.106  Yet the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause, from Dred Scott to the Civil Rights Cases,107 is a prime 
example of how language and intent are often in tension, and of how even the 
clearest of texts may fail to enact its framers’ intentions. 
Dred Scott, of course, is the original sin of originalism and a founding 
member of the “anticanon.”108  In that opinion, Chief Justice Taney 
infamously held that blacks were not “citizens” within the meaning of 
Article III for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and therefore could not 
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court.109  Taney concluded that Scott 
was not a citizen—a member of the political community entitled to the 
“privileges and immunities” possessed by other citizens—not simply because 
of his status as a slave (which made him “property” rather than a person), but 
because of his race and ancestry.110  In reaching this conclusion, Taney began 
with the following proposition: “The words ‘people of the United States’ and 
‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing”—namely, the 
sovereign people, the political community, and the individuals who govern 
and are governed.111  As evidence of this proposition, Taney pointed to the 
intentions of the Framers as contained in the Preamble to the Constitution, 
noting that: 
It declares that it is formed by the people of the United States; that is 
to say, by those who were members of the different political 
communities in the several States; and its great object is declared to be 
to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.  It 
speaks in general terms of the people of the United States, and of 
citizens of the several States, when it is providing for the exercise of 
the powers granted or the privileges secured to the citizen.  It does not 
define what description of persons are intended to be included under 
these terms, or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the 
 
106. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873) (noting the Fourteenth 
Amendment “declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their 
citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born 
within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States”). 
107. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
108. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380, 406–08 (2011) 
(identifying Dred Scott as part of the American anticanon and referring to Chief Justice Taney’s 
originalism as “bad originalism”). 
109. Scott, 60 U.S. at 427.  Specifically, Taney formulated the question as follows: 
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, 
become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the 
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and 
privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen?  One of which 
rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in 
the Constitution. 
Id. at 403. 
110. Id. at 403, 408, 422–23. 
111. Id. at 404. 
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people.  It uses them as terms so well understood, that no further 
description or definition was necessary.112 
Thus, according to Taney, African-Americans were not a part of the 
people nor were they citizens, based on an understanding that was not made 
explicit because it was too clear to explain.  Taney further listed, in 
excruciating detail, all of the reasons why the Framers could not possibly 
have imagined including African-Americans within this category when they 
drafted Article III and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.113  
Taney applied originalism with a vengeance, privileging original intent over 
reasonable claims about the meaning of the text on its face.114 
It was, of course, against this backdrop and that of the subsequent Civil 
War that the Fourteenth Amendment declared, “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”115  No 
longer could African-Americans be denied national citizenship on the theory 
embraced by Dred Scott, since the Fourteenth Amendment grounded 
citizenship in the irresistible biological fact of being born in the United 
States. 
Yet, famously, it took only a few years for the Supreme Court to void 
that language of much of its power by defining the “privileges and 
immunities” that attached to that citizenship—guaranteed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s next clause116—as referring only to those rights that 
individuals possessed by virtue of their relationship to the federal 
government.117  Those rights included such relatively insignificant powers as 
the right to travel to the national capital to petition or conduct business with 
the federal government; to claim protection of the federal government while 
on the high seas; and “free access to its seaports, through which all 
operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land 
offices, and courts of justice in the several States.”118  To say that the 
Slaughter-House Court literally nullified the meaning of the Citizenship 
Clause would hardly be an exaggeration, since, as pointed out by the dissent, 
all of those rights were already protected by the Constitution’s Supremacy 
 
112. Id. at 410–11. 
113. Id. at 406–09, 411–26. 
114. Id. at 410 (“The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human 
family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood.  But it is 
too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no 
part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration . . . .”). 
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
116. Id. cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
117. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). 
118. Id. 
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Clause, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment was not even needed to 
guarantee them.119 
The Slaughter-House Court achieved its feat by means of a clever 
intratextual argument, which demonstrates just how susceptible the text is to 
escaping whatever original intentions it may have embodied.  The phrase 
“privileges or immunities” in the Fourteenth Amendment seems intentionally 
chosen to mirror the “privileges and immunities” language of Article IV.  
That language, of course, had already been interpreted to refer to 
“fundamental” rights,120 so it seemed natural to assume that those were the 
rights that Congress meant to encompass within national citizenship and 
extend to America’s newest citizens.  Yet, the language’s verbatim 
repetition121 is precisely what opened it up to the opposite reading—a reading 
that assumed national citizenship, and its attendant privileges and 
immunities, must be distinct from state citizenship.122  This one textual move, 
in one fell swoop, emptied the Citizenship Clause of virtually all of its 
content.  Similarly, the Court acknowledged the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
dual citizenship language, which proclaimed “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States” to be “citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside,” and promptly turned it on its head.123  While it 
may be true, as the Court asserted, that Congress thereby created a category 
of national citizenship that was independent of state citizenship and to which 
all U.S.-born or -naturalized individuals were entitled, the Court again 
exploited this distinction to minimize the content of national citizenship, 
rather than to endow it with robust meaning, as the framers had likely 
intended.124 
The Slaughter-House Cases thus place into bold relief the inherent 
ability of language to escape its original context and take on new meanings.  
Even identical language within the same document may not always be 
interpreted in the same way; the repetition itself can suggest either that the 
meaning should be understood consistently or precisely the opposite—that 
the use in two different contexts was intended to produce two different and 
even contrasting meanings.  Of course, one possibility is that the historical 
context of Slaughter-House resulted in this arguably unwarranted 
 
119. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting); see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 22–23 (1980). 
120. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 75–76 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)). 
121. Well, almost verbatim.  Article IV refers to “privileges and immunities,” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 2 (emphasis added), while the Fourteenth Amendment, since it is phrased as a prohibition, 
states that no state can deprive a citizen of the “privileges or immunities” of citizenship, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
122. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74–78. 
123. Id. at 73–74; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
124. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74, 79; see, e.g., Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of 
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (1952). 
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interpretation.  The waning enthusiasm for Reconstruction even in the North, 
economic depression, and the labor unrest of the early 1870s no doubt 
influenced the majority’s view of the meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments and of the privileges and immunities to which all U.S. citizens 
are entitled.125  Moreover, the immediate factual context of the case—a suit 
brought not by blacks to vindicate their civil rights but by Southern whites to 
vindicate economic rights—likely influenced the probusiness Court to cabin 
the meaning of the Amendment’s provisions.126 
The Court’s opinion in Slaughter-House thus demonstrates that 
language possesses an ineluctable capacity to escape both theory and intent, 
as de Man argued.  The terms of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were undoubtedly aimed at granting a meaningful equality, 
accompanied by substantive rights, to African-Americans.  Yet, in Slaughter-
House the language presented itself in a new and frightening context—both 
in the sense that the suit was brought by white litigants seeking economic 
equality, and in the sense that the failures and tensions of Reconstruction had 
become manifest.  Indeed, it is, first, the very potential for using the 
Fourteenth Amendment to protect a broader swath of the population, 
including whites clamoring for economic protection, which demonstrates this 
quality of language.  While the notion that the rights proclaimed by the Civil 
War Amendments might extend beyond blacks to all members of society 
might not have been entirely foreign to the Amendment’s framers,127 its 
presentation here may well have been unanticipated.  The combination of 
“the free labor ideology of the time,”128 which led the butchers to present 
their case in terms of a fundamental right to exercise one’s trade, and 
increasing concern about claims of the have-nots to economic citizenship, 
might have made the country look very different in 1872 than it had in 1868. 
Whether such historical factors completely explain the Court’s decision 
or not, the fact remains that the inherent openness of language, due to its 
dependency on both context and iterability, make the Slaughter-House 
Court’s reading possible.  The use of the words “privileges and immunities,” 
which was likely intended to incorporate guarantees of fundamental rights 
already identified under Article IV, Section 1 against the states, as well as the 
use of the term “citizenship” to confer both state citizenship and national 
 
125. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 524–31 
(1988) (explaining how the depression, labor movement, and electoral realignment of 1874 
“strongly affected prevailing attitudes toward Reconstruction”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, 
at 146–49 (noting the almost universally positive reception of the decision in the Slaughter-House 
Cases). 
126. FONER, supra note 125, at 529–30. 
127. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 119, at 23–24 (“Abolitionist concerns had broadened over time 
. . . from a narrow focus on the rights of blacks to a broader occupation with the civil rights and 
liberties of everyone.  The various clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment reflect that 
development.”). 
128. Patrick Cronin, The Historical Origins of the Conflict Between Copyright and the First 
Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 221, 245 (2012). 
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citizenship on African-Americans, was instead used to demonstrate that there 
must be some distinction between national and state citizenship, enabling the 
majority to minimize the content of the former.129 
Though this familiar example of constitutional interpretation has often 
been understood as a willful misreading, it is in the de Manian sense simply 
an illustration of reading itself.130  The framers’ language escapes not only 
the original intent of those framers but also any theory of reading.  Neither 
originalism nor any other attempt to fix the meaning of constitutional text is 
of much use in the face of the malleability of language and its ability to take 
on new meanings in varying contexts.  Or, put differently, it is impossible to 
accept that any constitutional theory provides definitive answers to 
interpretive difficulties unless one simply refuses to read.  To see certainty 
anywhere in the constitutional text is simply to refuse to read it. 
B. The Meaning of the Religion Clauses 
The First Amendment to the Constitution proclaims that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”131  Since the Supreme Court and lower courts began 
enforcing the religion clauses in the first half of the twentieth century, 
debates have swirled around issues such as what it means to “establish” 
religion and when a law can be said to “prohibit” the exercise of religion.132  
The term “establishment of religion,” and its changing shape over the 
decades, has arguably been an important undercurrent in the shifting 
doctrinal landscape. 
The word “religion” is notoriously difficult to define, and the Supreme 
Court has largely dodged responsibility for attaching a definitive meaning to 
the term in the constitutional context.133  But setting aside philosophical 
debates about what does and does not constitute a belief system that can 
properly be characterized as a “religion,” the term in its constitutional 
dimension unquestionably has, and has long had, a significant cultural and 
 
129. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74–78. 
130. I emphasize here that this example is merely an illustration, and not a definitive proof, of 
de Man’s theory.  A meaningful attempt to demonstrate the truth of the theory on empirical rather 
than conceptual grounds would require an exhaustive study of constitutional interpretation, certainly 
one beyond the scope of this Article. 
131. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
132. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874–75 (2005) (“The First 
Amendment contains no textual definition of ‘establishment,’ and the term is certainly not self-
defining . . . .  There is no simple answer, for more than one reason.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1, 15 n.21 (1947) (collecting cases elaborating on the meaning and scope of the religion 
clauses). 
133. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970) (avoiding constitutional questions 
by declining to articulate a definition of religion for purposes of constitutional claims); United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court 
construed the term “Supreme Being” in the conscientious objector statute broadly so as to avoid 
constitutional issues (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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political dimension.  Regardless of what religion means in a technical sense, 
the language and practices that appear religious, as opposed to merely 
cultural, have changed over time and in doing so have reflected cultural and 
political realities on the ground. 
Abington School District v. Schempp134 is one example.  In that 
challenge to the then-common practice of reading Bible verses, without 
commentary, in the public schools, one of the principal arguments in the case 
was that the Bible was not a sectarian document and that the reading of 
verses did not constitute a form of religious instruction—at most, it was 
merely “moral” education.135  Of course, as many commentators have 
observed, the practice of Bible reading may not have seemed particularly 
religious, or certainly not sectarian, to many Protestants at the time.136  The 
schools, which had, after all, originated as places of Christian learning, 
retained a sort of pan-Protestant character well into the twentieth century.137  
The practice of reading unadorned verses from the King James Bible was 
seen as an accommodation of the various Protestant denominations that were 
represented in the school, but it was of course deeply alienating to Catholics 
and Jews, in particular, whose numbers were significant and growing.138  The 
Bible reading was experienced as a sectarian act by members of those 
groups, because the Jewish religion does not recognize the New Testament 
and Catholics use a different version of the Bible—the Douay.139 
It would be hard to come up with a clearer example of a situation where 
the changing social context—here, the increased religious diversity in 
American society—changed the understanding of a particular constitutional 
concept.  The Bible reading could be recognized as a sectarian religious 
practice, and therefore an unconstitutional establishment of religion, only in a 
culture where it was no longer accepted as universal.  Of course, religious 
diversity did not suddenly arise in the twentieth century in the United States, 
and indeed fierce battles were fought over sectarian religious practices in the 
nineteenth century as well.140  But until roughly the era of Schempp and its 
predecessor, Engel v. Vitale,141 it would be fair to suggest that, for most 
 
134. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
135. STEPHEN D. SOLOMON, ELLERY’S PROTEST: HOW ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRADITION 
& SPARKED THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER 163–66, 185–87 (2007). 
136. See, e.g., id. at 130–31 (citing RICHARD B. DIERENFIELD, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 50–51 (1962)) (suggesting that Bible reading was “often part of a broader devotional 
service, typically short in duration and held at the beginning of the day”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & 
James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 309–10 
(2001) (observing a growing public secularism, including among Protestants). 
137. See, e.g., SOLOMON, supra note 135, at 99–101, 108. 
138. Id. at 113–14; see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 136, at 279. 
139. SOLOMON, supra note 135, at 63. 
140. Id. at 115–31; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 136, at 299–305. 
141. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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Americans, Bible reading simply faded into the background political and 
social culture.142 
To take an even more contemporary example, consider the 
constitutional conundrum of so-called “ceremonial deism”—official religious 
references that are so familiar and deeply rooted in American tradition that 
they are often considered to be more patriotic than sectarian in nature.143  
Common examples include the national motto “In God We Trust,” the words 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, and swearing “so help me God” for 
judicial and other official proceedings.144  It seems reasonable to think that 
the only thing standing between invalidation of such practices under 
Schempp and the currently prevailing assumption that such phrases are 
generally constitutional145 is the background religious culture against which 
they are read.  As at least one commentator has pointed out, if the name 
“Allah” were substituted for “God,” it would be hard to see these phrases as 
similarly innocuous, nonsectarian, and nonreligious.146  If the United States 
came to be dominated by citizens of nonmonotheistic religions, it seems 
difficult to imagine that these words would still be read as fundamentally 
nonreligious, their historical pedigree notwithstanding. 
At the same time, the inevitable openness of what constitutes an 
“establishment of religion” has opened up the term to attacks from the 
opposite direction, creating the possibility of claims that driving religious 
speech and practice out of the public square has established a “religion” of 
secularism.147  Though still quite tenuous under Establishment Clause 
doctrine, it is easy to see how this understanding of religion could arise from 
a context in which a Christian majority experiences the sudden absence of its 
discourse from the public square, seemingly replaced by an equally 
comprehensive doctrine.148  The term “religion” is thus capable of expansion 
 
142. See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 136, at 299 (asserting that public education in 
America was, from the beginning, “religious but nonsectarian”). 
143. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2094–95 (1996) (defining ceremonial deism). 
144. See id. at 2091–92 (giving examples of ceremonial deism). 
145. See, e.g., id. at 2091–94 (describing numerous Supreme Court opinions in which the 
Justices have assumed, without deciding, that various types of ceremonial deism were 
constitutional). 
146. See id. at 2084–85. 
147. See, e.g., McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1330–31, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam) (affirming the dismissal of a suit asserting that the Alabama Supreme Court’s removal of 
the Ten Commandments from a state building unconstitutionally established a religion of 
“nontheistic beliefs[]”); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 519, 524 (9th Cir. 
1994) (affirming the dismissal of a suit claiming that evolutionism is a “religious belief system” that 
public school teachers cannot be required to teach). 
148. Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 
672–74 (1992) (discussing the “strongly felt perception” that religious viewpoints are systematically 
marginalized relative to secular ones in American public life and asserting that “many religious 
people clearly feel excluded and alienated from public life”). 
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to the point where it can mean both belief in a Supreme Being and the 
absence of all such belief. 
This brief illustration of the difficulties associated with defining 
“religion” and religious “establishment” tracks the theory outlined in Part II 
in two ways.  First, and most basically, it shows that we cannot really make 
sense of the term “establishment of religion”—at least not as a term with 
legal force and meaning—without drawing on the broader religious, political, 
and cultural context.  Indeed, “religion” itself is a word that is undeniably 
infused with cultural significance—it is a fact of cultural and social life.  And 
it seems beyond dispute that, with respect to the religion clauses, the 
changing cultural context has changed the understanding of those terms.  
(This is not to say that their meaning is, or ever was, uncontested, of course.  
It is precisely a feature of meaning’s context dependency that meaning is 
highly unstable.) Second, the possibility of changing meanings undermines 
the possibility of theoretical coherence.  Though an originalist might argue 
that practices such as ceremonial deism do not constitute “religious” 
practices or an “establishment of religion” according to the original 
understanding of those terms, it is exceedingly difficult to see the relevance 
of that conclusion today, in light of the religious diversity that exists in the 
United States.  To assert that invocations of God would not have been 
controversial or would not have struck the Framers as religious tells us very 
little about what is religious or sectarian when the Constitution is read in the 
contemporary context.  Any attempt to explain the acceptability of such 
religious references in the eighteenth century must be able to acknowledge 
the radically different religious landscape of today’s society and explain why 
the acceptability of such references in the eighteenth century is relevant 
today. 
IV. Implications 
The problem of reading and the concomitant failure of constitutional 
theory ultimately create a dilemma that reading itself cannot get us out of.  
What, then, can be done?  As stated earlier, this Article is sympathetic to the 
view that, since the mutual influence and interaction of law and politics is 
inevitable, the only option is simply to embrace it.  The inherent instability of 
language should make judges suspicious of the value of any constitutional 
theory but keenly attentive to the need to read the text.  Though reading does 
not lead to certainty, it perhaps leads to an interpretive openness that is 
valuable in making sense of an enduring document in an ever-changing 
society. 
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To the extent that this conception of constitutional theory appears to 
undermine its strength and validity, I would like to suggest that this should 
not necessarily be a source of anxiety, as it has apparently been for at least 
some courts and commentators alike.149  If politics, in the broad sense of 
public affairs or “facts on the ground,” inevitably helps to shape meaning, 
then there is no reason to bemoan or attempt to avoid this state of affairs.  
This perspective implies that recognition of the social context in which 
interpretation occurs is not only not illegitimate; it is necessary and desirable, 
even if it does not always lead judges to reach results that may be considered 
desirable from the perspective of all observers.  Indeed, the theory of 
meaning presented here clearly eschews the possibility of single, correct 
legal answers. 
This perspective also implies that judges should not be constitutional 
theorists.150  They should, above all, be close readers of texts.  For this 
reason, they are trained to read and interpret legal documents.  Moreover, 
though inevitably influenced by their own personal backgrounds and the 
culture that surrounds them, they are at least somewhat constrained by the 
text at hand.  In no sense does postmodern theory deny the reality of such a 
constraint.  Indeed, judges’ ability to independently investigate the case at 
hand is intentionally limited (especially for appellate judges)—they lack the 
staff and the wide-ranging subpoena power of legislatures.  Their primary 
tools are access to mounds of precedent and the assistance of recently minted 
law graduates, themselves purportedly expert readers.  It is, thus, both an 
assertion of judicial supremacy and a limitation on that branch to say, simply, 
that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”151 
It is true, of course, that this understanding of the judge’s role with 
respect to reading privileges that reading over those of other constitutional 
actors—democratically elected officials as well as the people themselves.  In 
my understanding here, judges are, like literary critics, a species of expert 
readers, and they do occupy a special position with respect to the interpretive 
undertaking.  Their readings are influenced by the social and political context 
that they inhabit, as well as their personal biases.  At the same time, they are 
in some measure constrained by text and precedent and indoctrinated with 
the view that law must consist of something other than raw preference.  
 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 2–9. 
150. Judge Richard Posner makes the argument that judges should not engage in moral theory 
but instead should be pragmatists in Problematics, supra note 40, at 1645. 
151. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Indeed, the notion that the 
judiciary’s duty is “to say what the law is” seems itself to partake of two possible meanings of the 
word “say”—one descriptive, one performative.  Does the judiciary “say” what the law is as if it is 
just reading some unseen script that is determinate and fixed, but only revealed upon careful study 
(like one might “say” the Pledge of Allegiance)?  Or does it “say” what the law is by imposing its 
“say-so”—that is, by declaring or effectuating what the law is (as one might say, or pronounce, the 
meaning of a particular constitutional provision)? 
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Though no reader is an ideal or perfect reader—such a creature hardly seems 
possible—there need not be elitism in simply asserting that judges are 
uniquely well-trained readers of particular kinds of texts. 
Reading is, after all, a skill—just ask any literary critic. 
